The Burdens and Benefits of Race in America by Ogletree, Charles J., Jr.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 25
Number 2 Winter 1998 Article 5
1-1-1998
The Burdens and Benefits of Race in America
Charles J. Ogletree Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Burdens and Benefits of Race in America, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol25/iss2/5
The Burdens and Benefits of Race in
America
Matthew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture
By CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR.
Introduction
Judge Matthew 0. Tobriner, in his memorable dissent in Bakke,' ar-
gued for an understanding of the importance of race in America which it-
self transcended race. He contended that the majority opinion was wrong
to adopt a colorblind interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 To do
so was to fail to account for the manner in which minorities had been his-
torically disadvantaged and excluded from full participation in American
society.3 Instead, the challenge is to acknowledge the benefits and burdens
of different racial identities while refusing to let those differences frustrate
the struggle for social justice.4 Judge Tobriner recognized that U.C.
Davis's "special admission program was implemented to serve the larger
national interest of promoting an integrated society in which persons of all
races are represented in all walks of life and at all income levels."5 The
• Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Director, Harvard Law School Criminal Justice
Institute. I would like to acknowledge the support of my colleagues for their constructive criti-
cisms during the presentation of this article at the 1996 Harvard Law School Summer Research
Luncheon Series. I would like to especially acknowledge the substantial research of two assis-
tants, Ms. Erin Edmonds and Mr. Eric Miller. Of course, I accept full responsibility for all errors
and shortcomings.
1. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (1976) (To-
briner, J., dissenting), affd in part, rev'd in part, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See idl at 1173.
3. See id. at 1174.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 1188.
[219]
problems of race are national in character, and not limited to one particular
geographical community, or one specific race or ethnicity.6
The role of a court faced with the issue of racial discrimination is, ac-
cording to Judge Tobriner, relatively straightforward. The court should
protect the rights of minorities from being overridden by the will of the
majority, wherever possible: heightened judicial scrutiny is accordingly
appropriate when reviewing laws embodying invidious racial classifica-
tions, because the political process affords an inadequate check on dis-
crimination against "discrete and insular minorities."7 By the same token,
however, such stringent judicial review is not appropriate when, as here,
racial classifications are utilized remedially to benefit such minorities, for
under such circumstances the normal political process can be relied on to
protect the majority who may be incidentally injured by the classification
scheme.8
To this end, using arguments which are still at the forefront of the
affirmative action debate, Judge Tobriner rejected a colorblind reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he emphasized the importance of
race-conscious remedial action in overcoming the disadvantages con-
ferred upon minorities by virtue of their race.9 He further contended that
the goal of creating a society tolerant of all racial groups ought not be
frustrated by a misplaced and confusing emphasis on arbitrary measure-
ments of merit, such as those embodied in standardized test scores.
10
This viewpoint has recently been revived by Lani Guinier who asserts
that we must move beyond the false opposition of merit and affirmative
action to recast the debate in terms of what values we, as a community,
wish to promote."
Judge Tobriner's dissent exemplifies the importance of attention to
the problems of race in American society. Only by acknowledging these
problems can they be overcome. It was a great privilege to be able to pres-
ent my own examination of the benefits and burdens of race in a speech
given in his honor. In this Essay based on that speech, I try to examine
these benefits and burdens historically, philosophically, and politically by
focusing, in particular, upon the issue of race in the criminal justice sys-
tem.
6. See id. at 1180.
7. Id. at 1183.
8. See id. at 1182.
9. See id. at 1174-75.
10. See id. at 1186-87.
11. See LANI GUINIER Er AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTrITUTIONAL CHANGE 11 (1997).
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I. Historical Analysis of Racial Awareness in the United States
A. A Race-Conscious Declaration?
The Declaration of Independence proclaims:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unal-
ienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its Foundations on such Principles,
and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
12
These words, so sacred, so promising, have reigned as a liturgy of hope
and aspiration for all United States citizens. Yet from the beginning these
words have meant different things to different people in the context of his-
tory. As Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has stated, "From a predominantly
white perspective, the Declaration of Independence is viewed as... 'the
greatest achievement in the history of man.' We are the beneficiaries of that
achievement. But who, until recently, did the 'we' describe?"
13
The problem is that while the Declaration does not say all white men
are created equal, history shows that it should have.14 Those Americans
not in that favored class have traditionally been all too conscious of the
ambiguity inherent in the words of the Declaration. We have recognized
that in fact the words applied only to a privileged few, but understand that
they ought to apply to all, regardless of race. We have shouldered the bur-
den of imbuing the promises of the Declaration and Constitution with the
moral force of a truly just and equal society.
People of color have had to continually insist on those rights and
privileges of democratic participation granted to all by the Declaration of
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
13. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS 5 (1978).
14. See id. Thomas Jefferson, who owned slaves, drafted a condemnation of the interna-
tional slave trade. That clause was deleted from the Declaration during the debates between July
2 and July 4 of 1776, despite having been approved by the Committee of Five to the Continental
Congress. See id. at 380. This single anti-slavery clause was deleted not only to assuage the
South, but also because plenty of Northerners had been "pretty considerable carriers of [slaves]."
Id. at 380-382. The omission of "white" probably stemmed from Jefferson's-perhaps many of
the Continental Congressmen's-hypocrisy regarding the ideals of the Enlightenment versus the
moral contradiction inherent in their owning African people. Higginbotham reports that Jeffer-
son, five years later, wrote, "[i]ndeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that
[H]is justice cannot sleep forever." Id. at 383.
Independence. Sojourner Truth's cry, "Ain't I a woman?". 5 was taken up
and transformed by sanitation workers who, with Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., declared "I am a man. 16 It was championed by Rever-
end Jesse Jackson, Sr. when he proclaimed "I am somebody." Each of
these statements: Ain't I a woman?; I am a man; I am somebody; contain
the fierce and embattled announcement that, despite everything, the
speakers were self-possessed and dignified human beings. This burden
of proving ourselves worthy participants in American democracy, which
is as jold as American society itself, is still shouldered by African-
Americans today.
I shall begin my discussion of the benefits and burdens of race in
America by considering the works of three African-Americans whose lives
span the period from slavery to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's:
Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Their
response to the burdens of race in America will form the context in which I
discuss the burdens of race presently afflicting the African-American
community, most particularly in the sphere of criminal justice. I shall ar-
gue that the challenges faced by the African-American community are ones
which are symptomatic of American society as a whole. They are chal-
lenges which can only be met by concerted action across racial lines. The
benefit of race is that minorities are often in a position to see more clearly
where America fails in its promise to protect the weak and powerless. The
burden of race is that the responsibility often falls on minorities to hold
America to that promise, often at considerable cost to ourselves.
15. Like Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth is among the most famous of Black female abo-
litionists. She delivered, in a "deep, resonant voice... with a strange, religious mysticism,"
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
NEGRO AMERICANs 166 (6th ed. 1988), a speech before an assembly of white men and women at
an anti-slavery rally in Indiana. See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND
FEMINMM 160 (1981). A white man yelled at Sojourner that he didn't believe she was really a
woman. Sojourner bared her breasts. And then delivered the following:
Well, children, war dar is so much racket dar must be something out o' kilter. I tink dat
'twixt de niggers of de Souf and de women at de Norf all a talkin 'bout rights, de white
men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all dis here talkin' bout? Dat man ober dar
say dat women needs to be helped into carriages, and lifted ober ditches, and to have de
best places... and ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! ... I have plowed,
and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me-and ain't I a woman? I
could work as much as any man (when I could get it), and bear de lash as well-and ain't I
a woman? I have borne five children and I seen 'em mos all sold off into slavery, and
when I cried out with a mother's grief, none but Jesus hear-and ain't I a woman?
Id. at 160.
16. STEPHEN OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LiFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
n.469 (1982).
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B. From Slavery to Freedom: Frederick Douglass
Frederick Douglass was born into slavery in Maryland, the offspring
of an enslaved black woman and a white man, probably her master.17 His
mother was taken from him when he was a baby. He saw her four or five
times, when she risked her life by traveling twelve long miles and back in
the dark of night to comfort her child to sleep. 18 She died when he was
seven.
19
As a child on a plantation of over 300 slaves, Douglass had nothing to
wear, even in winter, but two coarse cloth shirts. 2° He taught himself to
read and was determined to run away, risking death, rather than be shack-
led and stunted by slavery.2' After his escape, he became acquainted with
William Lloyd Garrison, abolitionist and publisher of The Liberator.
Douglass soon became a central figure in the abolition movement, a trusted
advisor of white abolitionists, and even of Abraham Lincoln. 22 After the
Civil War, he campaigned for the right of African-Americans and women
to vote.2
Douglass was one of the first Americans to examine the disparity
between white and black understandings of the significance of the Decla-
ration of Independence. He chose the Fourth of July to remind his mostly
white audience that what was to them an emblem of freedom was not so
for African-Americans. He called the signers of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence brave and admirable men despite his clear denunciation of their
qualified liberty for all,24 then posed a number of pointed questions:
What have I, or those I represent, to do with your national independ-
ence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural
justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to
us? ... This Fourth of July is yours, not mine.... What, to the
American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer: a day that reveals to
him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cru-
elty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a
sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national great-
17. See Philip S. Foner, Frederick Douglass, in 1 THE LIFE AND WRITrNGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS 15 (Philip Foner ed., 1950) [THE LIFE AND WRTINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, a
three volume work, will hereinafter be referred to as THE LE AND WRrrINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, preceded by the volume number.].
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 17, at 255-60.
21. See id. at 276-306.
22. See 1 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 17, at 26.
23. See 3 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 17, at 42.
24. 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 17, at 188-92 (a
speech entitled, The Meaning of the Fourth of July for the Negro given on the Fourth of July at
Rochester, New York, in 1852).
ness, swelling vanity .... your sermons and thanksgivings, with all
your religious parade and solemnity are, to [God], mere bombast,
fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy-a thin veil to cover up
crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages .... [F]or revolt-
ing barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a ri-
val.2
5
Douglass's greatness lies in the fact that he did not release America
from its promise of democracy for all. He demanded that this promise be
honored. He did not cave in to the vision of American society put forward
by Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sanford.26 Taney argued that the Con-
stitution never intended that African-Americans be citizens of the United
States.27 In so doing, Taney adopted the flaws of the Constitution as in-
tentional and irredeemable. Douglass rejected this vision. He declared
that the Constitution, a much more conservative document than the Decla-
ration of Independence, was not, in and of itself, pro-slavery. 28 Instead, he
sought to perfect the promise of the Constitution, to make an America that
embraced citizens of all races.
C. The Voice of a Race: W.E.B. Du Bois
W.E.B. Du Bois was born on February 23, 1868 in Great Barrington,
Massachusetts. His brilliance shone early: he excelled in most subjects,
and advanced through grades more quickly than the other students. At
twelve years old, Du Bois entered high school; at fifteen, he took up jour-
nalism and began to report on the black community for the New York
Globe. In 1885, with help from the local church, Du Bois, entered Fisk
University in Tennessee with advanced sophomore standing. There he
25. Id.
26. 60 U.S. 393,403-07 (1857).
27. See id. at 404.
28. See William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1987). Taney's view regarding whether the Constitution was pro-
slavery in and of itself incited a raging battle among historians that continues to this day.
29. See W.E.B. Du BOiS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU Bois: A SOLILOQUY ON
VIEWING MY LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS CENTURY 61 (1968) [hereinafter, Du Bois,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY]. His great-grandfather was a doctor descended from French Huguenot immi-
grants who, living in Haiti, owned slaves and, with a bi-racial woman, bore Du Bois's grandfa-
ther in 1803. See id. at 65. Du Bois's father, Alfred Du Bois was born in Haiti in 1825 and
eventually settled in Massachusetts. See id. at 66. Du Bois's maternal great-great grandfather,
Tom Burghardt, was kidnapped from West Africa, enslaved, and brought to Massachusetts. See
id. at 62. He was freed during the Revolutionary War. See id. He then settled just outside Great
Barrington, and his descendants farmed and worked as hired labor and servants throughout the
area. See id at 63. Du Bois's mother, Mary Burghardt was born in 1831 of African and Dutch
ancestry. See id. at 64. She married Alfred Du Bois in 1867, and W.E.B. was born one year
later. See id. at 72. Du Bois' father moved to Connecticut with the expectation that his wife and
their child would eventually join him; Du Bois's mother decided against the move, and W.E.B.
never saw his father again. See id. at 72-73.
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studied German, Greek, Latin, classical literature, philosophy, ethics,
chemistry, and physics. In 1888, at twenty, Du Bois was admitted to Har-
vard College where he studied philosophy with the great philosophers
William James and George Santayana. He studied in Germany for two
years, visiting all of Europe, was denied a Ph.D. from the Germans because
of his short tenure there,30 and returned to the U.S. to accept a chair in
classics at Wilberforce University.3' In 1895, Du Bois became the first Af-
rican-American to receive his Ph.D. from Harvard. 2
Du Bois' greatest achievements, however, are probably the publica-
tion in 1903 of The Souls of Black Folk3 3 and his involvement in the
founding and running of the NAACP. While both had a profound impact
on the history of race relations in this country, his book immortalized the
burdens of race in declaring that the great problem of the twentieth century
was to be the problem of the color line.34 Du Bois wrote:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields him no
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two[-
Iness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unre-
conciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dog-
ged strength alone keeps it from being tom asunder.
The description of the African-American condition as "double con-
sciousness" is the lineal descendent of Douglass's critique of the Constitu-
tion.36 Douglass essentially argued that black understanding of the Decla-
ration of Independence or the Constitution is ironic. The Declaration,
while purportedly a document embodying liberation, is actually an instru-
ment of oppression. Only by perceiving the Declaration (or the Constitu-
tion) in both capacities can we understand how it is viewed by black peo-
ple. Du Bois appropriated this argument when he suggested that, as a
general matter, the African-American condition is similarly ironic.38 Ac-
30. See DuBOiS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 29, at 175.
31. See id.at 185.
32. See id.
33. W.E.B. Du BOiS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Dodd, Mead & Company ed., 1979)
(1903) [hereinafter, DU BOIS, SouLs OFBLACKFOLK].
34. See id. at 3.
35. Id.
36. See supra hotes 24-28.
37. See 2 Tl LIFE AND WRrriNGS OFFREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 17, at 118, 119,
181-204.
38. See Du BoIs, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, supra note 33, at 3.
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knowledging one's blackness depends upon seeing oneself as a subject, a
human being endowed with those rights and qualities possessed by all
other human beings. However, it also depends upon seeing oneself,
through white people's eyes, as an object. Such a dual-perspective is the
only explanation for the way in which the races are separated from each
other and assigned superior or inferior status. Unlike white people, who
exist comfortably within their subjectivity,
[the black man has the burden of struggling to] attain self-conscious
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would
not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the
world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of
white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message
for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be
both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon
by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed
roughly in his face.
3 9
This description of the black condition, as much as anything else, has
cemented Du Bois's position as one of this century's most influential
American philosophers of race. The idea that African-Americans see the
world from two different perspectives, that of the oppressor and the op-
pressed, embodies both the benefits and burdens of race.
D. Reconstituting the American Dream: Martin Luther King
W.E.B. Du Bois died on the eve of Martin Luther King's March on
Washington.4° Taylor Branch, remarking on King's struggle to reach the
top of the steps of the Lincoln Monument through a crowd of at least
300,000 and his final ascension there, wrote:
An ancient man reached halfway around the world to fix the histori-
cal moment: W.E.B. Du Bois had died in Ghana. In making the an-
nouncement over the huge loudspeakers at the march, Roy Wil-
kins... [announced], "[I]t is incontrovertible that at the dawn of the
twentieth century [Du Bois's voice] was the voice that was calling to
you to gather here today in this cause."
41
King got up to the podium, spoke for awhile from prepared text and
then did what he did best: preached extemporaneously, moved by wisdom,
hope, and grief. In what is now known as the "I have a dream" speech,
39. Id.
40. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963,
878 (1988).
41. Id.
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King reiterated the criticism of American democracy made by Douglass
and Du Bois. 42 He said:
We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro's basic mobility is from
a smaller ghetto to a larger one....
We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot
vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to
vote. No, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until jus-
tice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty
stream ....
I... have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American
dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true
meaning of its creed-we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal.43
King's invocation of the American dream is, I believe, an attempt to
reconstitute the dream on a new and more just basis. He extended the de-
bate on racial justice pursued by Douglass and Du Bois beyond the Decla-
ration of Independence or the Constitution, and beyond the condition of
blackness as a philosophical concept. Instead, King sought to reinvent the
American Dream itself along racially inclusive lines. He demanded that
the opportunities for achievement and advancement be extended to all citi-
zens regardless of race.44
The burden of race in America is the extent to which this vision has
been denied to people of color. The benefit of race is that African-
Americans are in a position to understand the tremendous impact race has
on our society. We acknowledge that impact as we seek to overcome it.
H. Shifting Discrimination Paradigms in the
Criminal Justice System
A. Color-Blind Anti-Discrimination: Randall Kennedy
This author argued that a consistent thread of criticism runs through
African-American discussions of American democracy. Such a critique
focuses upon the manner in which people of color experience the world
and the law, as both Americans and, quite differently, as African-
Americans. Nowhere is this more true than in the criminal justice system.
42. See supra notes 24-28, 34-39 and accompanying text.
43. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 104 (James M. Washington ed., 1992).
44. See id.
African-Americans are grossly over-represented in the criminal jus-
tice system.45 In part, this is due to the fact that, per capita, black people
do commit more crimes than whites.46 However this fact alone does not
account for the disparities in the crime statistics. In fact, since the 1970s,
rates of black crime have been stable, even though the rates of prosecution
have increased exponentially. 47 Furthermore, once inside the criminal jus-
tice system, African-Americans are more likely to suffer violence at the
hands of the police,48 less likely to receive an equitable plea bargain,49 and
45. See CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL 193-
94 (1996). Blacks now comprise 50.8 percent of the inmates in our prisons and jails. See id. at
193. One out of every eleven black adults is in prison or jail, or on probation or parole. See id.
At any one time, 6 to 7 percent of black males twenty-five to thirty-four years old is in state or
federal prisons. See id. While blacks comprise 12.5 percent of the U.S. population, they make
up 55 percent of the new incarcerations. See id. According to Bureau of Justice statistics, the
proportion of black male adults behind bars in 1994 was almost eight times higher than the pro-
portion of white males. See id. at 193-94. If present trends continue, an absolute majority of
black males aged eighteen to forty will be incarcerated in one form or another by the year 2010.
See id. at 194. African-Americans are incarcerated at a rate of 1,947 per 100,000 African-
American citizens compared to a rate of 306 per 100,000 for white citizens. See id. African-
American males make up less than 7 percent of the U.S. population, yet they comprise almost
half of the prison and jail population. See id. In 1992, 56 percent of all African-American men
aged 18 to 35 in Baltimore were under some form of criminal justice supervision on any given
day. See id. In the District of Columbia, the figure was 42 percent. See id. One out of every
three African-American men between the ages of 20 and 29 in the entire country-including sub-
urban and rural areas-was under some form of criminal justice supervision in 1994. See iL
46. See STEVE R. DONZIGER, THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N 99 (1996).
47. See id. at 99-100. Since the mid-1970s, African-Americans have consistently accounted
for about 45 percent of those arrested for murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. See id.
at 100. These numbers tell us that the proportion of overall crime committed by African-
Americans has not increased for several years. See id. Yet since 1980, the African-American
prison population has increased dramatically while the white prison population has increased far
less. See id.
48. See THE NAACP AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY
COMMUNITIES 29-45 (1995) [hereinafter NAACP]. The investigation lists a number of findings,
including: excessive force has become a standard part of the arrest procedure; physical abuse by
police officers is not unusual or aberrational; verbal abuse and harassment are the most common
forms of police abuse and are standard police behavior in minority communities; and false
charges and retaliatory actions against abused citizens sometimes follow incidents of abuse. See
id. See also Charles J. Ogletree, Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions?, THE CHAMPION,
July 1991, at 7, 10 [hereinafter, Ogletree, Race]. A number of studies have documented the un-
usually high arrest rates for blacks suspected of crime compared to other groups. See id. Addi-
tionally, there have been studies showing the excessive use of deadly force by police officers in
pursuing both armed and unarmed black suspects. See id. In one study, it was learned that
blacks were ten times more likely than whites to have been shot at by police officers, eighteen
times more likely to be wounded, and five times more likely to be killed. See id. This pattern of
conduct by the police is born out by other data revealing police propensity to focus on minorities
in criminal investigations. See id.
49. See DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 112.
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up to seven times more likely to be sentenced to death than their white
counterparts.50 The mandatory minimum sentences which were intended to
rid our streets of drugs have instead stolen minority youth from their com-
munities; they penalize blacks, who use crack cocaine, up to 100 times
more harshly than their white counterparts who use powder cocaine.
These sentencing guidelines send conflicting messages to young people:
our supposedly fair and equal justice system treats them differently on the
basis of their choice of the same drug.
Randall Kennedy, arguing for a race-blind society, has written elo-
quently and powerfully about the role of race, most notably on the effect of
capital punishment on the African-American community 5 2  Like many
Americans, Kennedy does not believe that capital punishment is wrong in
theory; instead, he argues that capital punishment is acceptable only when
it is enforced in a colorblind manner.53 He characterizes this point of view
as a victim-centered approach which shifts attention from African-
American criminals and toward those predominantly black individuals who
suffer as a result of black crime.54 He discusses McClesky v. Kemp,55 in
which an African-American, sentenced to death in Georgia for the murder
of a white policeman, appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that
in Georgia an individual who murdered a white person was four times
more likely to receive a death sentence than an individual who murdered a
black person. 56 According to Kennedy, McClesky was wrongly decided
not because it failed to value the life of the black criminal, but because it
failed to value the lives of black victims. 57 Also according to Kennedy,
however, more black murderers should be sentenced for the killing of Afri-
can-Americans, not fewer.
58
This line of thought colors Kennedy's discussion of the appropriate
response to the use of crack cocaine as the drug of choice in the black
community. He contends that the courts may be doing the black commu-
nity a favor, and certainly are not doing anything unconstitutional, by pun-
50. See id. at 114.
51. See ROWAN, supra note 45, at 194. If you are caught with five grams of crack cocaine
(about two pennies in weight, $500 in street value), a judge must impose a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years even in the absence of intent to sell. See id. With powdered cocaine, how-
ever, you need to have 500 grams of the substance (more than a pound, worth about $50,000)
before the same five-year mandatory minimum sentence is imposed. See id.
52. See Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988) [hereinafter, Kennedy, McClesky].
53. See id. at 1436-40.
54. See Ua at 1391-94.
55. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
56. See iL at 355 (Blackmun, J., Dissenting).
57. See Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 1394.
58. See id. at 1436.
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ishing African-Americans more severely than whites for the use of crack
rather than powder cocaine.59 As with his discussion of capital punish-
ment, he suggests that the harsher punishment actually empowers the black
community.60 He advocates that more punishment will lead to more
equality. I reject that notion and think that it is not at all a solution to the
problem of race in America.
It is instructive to compare Kennedy's position with those held by mi-
nority conservative critics Glenn C. Loury and Dinesh D'Souza. Loury as-
sumes that the consequences of policing on minority communities are
fairly straightforward: the streets are made secure and the criminals are
punished.61 The effects of the criminal justice system are, so far as the
non-criminal segment of the community is concerned, benign-even bene-
ficial. However, this analysis fails to explain why African-American lead-
ers would refuse to authorize increases in police activity in their commu-
nities.62 Loury's explanation is that the black community identifies with
the criminals who suffer as a result of police activity and thus seeks to
63protect them from the full force of the law. Now, while there may be
some truth in the argument that black people feel a bond of 'kinship' to
one another along racial lines, it is naYve in the extreme to believe that this
kinship is the only barrier between the black community and safe, peaceful
neighborhoods. Loury's argument rests upon both an unjustified belief in
black tolerance of black crime 4 and an uncritical acceptance (or an unbe-
lievable ignorance) of the impact of the criminal justice system on the Af-
rican-American community.
D'Souza, on the other hand, does not believe that the policing of the
African-American community is free from racial bias. Instead he argues
that the racial stereotypes employed by the police may be justified because
they are "rational" or "efficient." He argues that
[s]ince policemen know from experience that blacks-especially
young African American males-are more likely to commit street
crimes than whites, they... may practice a kind of rational discrimi-
nation. This would not mean, of course, that they arrest young
blacks simply.for being black, but rather that they are more disposed
59. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Com-
ment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994) [hereinafter, Kennedy, Criminal Law].
60. See id. at 1267.
61. See GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON
RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 298-99 (1995) (endorsing John Dilulio's suggestion that
"[p]ublic policy should aim at securing the streets, schools, and housing projects of inner-city
communities[,] and the bad guys should be kept behind bars for longer periods of time." Id.)
62. See id. at 299.
63. See id. at 300-01.
64. See ROWAN, supra note 45, at 185.
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to see young blacks as potential criminals and thus show some bias
in the way that they pursue some criminals and not others.
65
D'Souza's approach is fatally flawed in two ways. First, it is uncon-
stitfitional. Drug courier profiles, search and seizure laws, and all the rest
are used to invade the freedoms of the black community far more than the
white community,66 and many observers do believe these laws are em-
ployed in a racially discriminatory manner.67 However, such tactics are
never justified on the basis of race because such justification would be un-
constitutional.68 If the Constitution is not reason enough for D'Souza (the
Constitution does not, after all, provide an efficient blueprint for running
society), strong moral reasons exist for not prejudging an individual's
criminality on the basis of his race alone. Individuals should be permitted
to enjoy liberty unfettered by the threat of arbitrary police intervention.
That is, remember, one of the basic freedoms that the American Republic
was constituted to promote. Rational or not, an individual's freedoms
ought not to be limited by his or her race.
As it happens, the point is precisely that much of the enforcement of
criminal law is irrational; it is not reason but racial animus which moti-
vates many of the practices adopted by the criminal justice system.69 Ac-
cording to D'Souza, racial bias does not help catch more criminals (how
could it? one either is, or is not, a criminal regardless of race); it merely
channels police action toward catching a certain, racially specific, group of
criminals.7 0
Kennedy, while not adopting either of these ill-considered positions,
adopts an ill-considered position of his own. Kennedy's virtue is that, un-
like Loury, he acknowledges and criticizes racism in the operation of
criminal justice system. In his discussion of McClesky, Kennedy analyzes,
in great detail, the lack of racial sensitivity which underpinned much of the
Supreme Court's reasoning.71 He accuses a "Court... confronted by the
most extensive study of capital sentencing in American history, a study
that presented patterns of racial disparity that are undeniably suspicious,
regardless of one's eventual judgment as to the legal status of McClesky's
claim [(i.e. the Baldus study), of becoming] [p]aralyzed by [the] fear that
65. DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM 284 (1995).
66. See Ogletree, Race, supra note 48, at 4-5.
67. See, e.g., DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 109-10.
68. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (commenting on wholesale harass-
ment of minorities, particularly "Negroes," by certain elements of the police community as over-
bearing, harassing and trenching upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justifi-
cation required by the Constitution).
69. NAACP, supra note 48, at 9-12.
70. See D'souzA, supra note 65, at 284.
71. See id. at 1408-21.
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seeing would entail doing."72 "[T]he justices inflicted upon themselves a
myopia reminiscent of the one that afflicted the Court during the reign of
Plessy v. Ferguson."73
This insensitivity to race is apparent in "the manner in which the
McClesky majority articulated and defended its decision [which] shows an
egregious disregard for the sensibilities of black Americans."74 The deci-
sion itself contends that the Baldus study, "the most comprehensive analy-
sis to date of racial influences in capital sentencing in a single state,, 75
"[a]t most indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race."76
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, points out that McClesky himself "could
not fail to grasp [the study's] essential narrative line: there was a signifi-
cant chance that race would play a prominent role in determining if he
lived or died. 77 But the rhetoric of a Court which has often bent over
backwards to avoid alienating white racists "made no attempt to assuage
the inevitable anger and anxiety that the decision would generate within
the black community.
78
Although Kennedy criticizes the justices, he nevertheless accepts the
notion that there may be no conscious discrimination on the part of the ju-
rors in Georgia who sentence black murderers of whites to death at four
times the rate of blacks who murder other African-Americans.79 Instead,
he suggests, "race-of-the-victim disparities in sentencing probably reflect
racially selective empathy more than racially selective hostility. ' 80 He be-
lieves that the jurors "relate more fully to the suffering of white victims:
black victims remain strangers while white victims can be imagined as
family or friends." 81 His solution, though, is not to quash the death penalty
for those African-Americans who have murdered whites, but to demand
that white jurors impose the same sentence for African-Americans who kill
other African-Americans as for African-Americans who kill whites. 2
Kennedy applies this "victim centered" argument to the problem of
drug abuse in the black community. 3 Unlike D'Souza, he does believe
72. I . at 1415.
73. Id. at 1415-16 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
74. Id. at 1417.
75. Id. at 1396.
76. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 312. See also Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at
1415.
77. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 1418.
79. See id. at 1388, 1419-20.
80. Id. at 1420.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1425.
83. See id. at 1388.
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that minorities have a right to (discrimination-free) police protection.84
However, he asserts that the increased threat from crime faced by minority
communities requires a proportionately greater rate of police intervention
than that experienced by majority communities.85 He contends that
the principal problem facing African-Americans in the context of
criminal justice today is not over-enforcement but under-
enforcement of laws. The most lethal danger facing African-
Americans in their day-to-day lives is not white, racist officials of the
state, but private, violent criminals (typically black) who attack those
most vulnerable to them without regard to racial identity.
8 6
The victim-based argument of his McClesky article takes on a new
turn when applied to other aspects of the criminal justice system. In the
same way that black murderers of other blacks ought to be sentenced as
harshly as black murderers of whites, the extra attention that the black
community receives from law enforcement officials is characterized as the
achievement of racial equality, a gain in civil rights.8 7 As Kennedy argues,
it eliminates the "racially invidious under-enforcement [of criminal laws
which] purposefully denies African-American victims of violence the
things that all persons legitimately expect from the state: civil order and, in
the event that crimes are committed, best efforts to apprehend and punish
offenders."88 Black victims of crime finally are able to receive that equal-
ity of effort from the criminal justice system that all citizens are entitled to
expect.
Kennedy's analysis proposes that the present policing of crack co-
caine use grants more than mere equality to the black community; it favors
it. The criminal justice system has graciously targeted black communities
in order to rid them of drug abuse by instituting harsher penalties for those
drug-related crimes which predominantly affect the black community.
Kennedy quotes with approval Kate Stith's contention that "the legisla-
ture's action [in imposing harsher penalties for crack use] might
also... [be] viewed as a laudatory attempt to provide enhanced protection
to those communities-largely black... -who are ravaged by abuse of
this potent drug.
' 89
All this suggests that Kennedy is willing to address the problem of ra-
cism when it is confined to the operation of various measures which im-
pact upon the black community in a racially invidiousmanner. That is,
84. See id. at 1424.
85. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1259.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1267.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Kate Stith, The Government Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is It
Anyway?, in PuBLIc VALUES IN CoNsTrnmONALLAw 137, 158 (Stephen Gottlieb ed., 1993)).
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where two individuals are tried for the same offense, Kennedy is as critical
as anyone of disparities in treatment based on race. That was the issue
facing the Court in McClesky. Kennedy's solution was to recommend not
just the killing of more white criminals but more black ones as well.90
However, he does not consider that the possibility that the measures them-
selves could be directed at particular (racial) communities in a racially dis-
criminatory manner. As long as all criminals who are punished for the
same crime are punished equally, Kennedy's argument supposes, the law
does not discriminate on basis of race when it chooses to criminalize more
harshly, or more comprehensively, the activities of a racially distinct sub-
set of the American populace. 91 Tailoring certain offenses to a particular
community-in this case the black community-is, as far as Kennedy is
concerned, perfectly justifiable.92 That means that it is all right for the
legislature to specify a 'black' crime-crack-as the special concern of the
'war on drugs' so long as those white criminals who are caught using or
peddling crack are punished as severely as the black ones. It is thus per-
fectly defensible to disproportionately arrest and punish black drug users
while virtually ignoring white users.
Two presumptions, upon which this conservative response to charges
of racism in the operation of the criminal justice system is based, must be
addressed with urgency. First, Kennedy's argument depends upon dis-
counting the criminal as an important element in the measurement of ra-
cism. He makes this clear from his discussion of McClesky.93 Adopting a
community-oriented approach,94 Kennedy represents black criminality as
inimicable to the well-being of the community and contends it should be
ignored in any measurement of the impact of the criminal justice system on95 ,96
African-Americans. He employs a 'benefits and burdens' measurement
of racial harm which assumes that only criminals are burdened by the
measures imposed by the criminal justice system, while the African-
American community as a whole is benefited. Kennedy's methodological
90. The upshot of Kennedy's arguments would be that fewer white killers of African-
Americans would escape the death penalty. See Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 1425.
However, because black murderers predominantly choose black victims, death sentences for Af-
rican-Americans would increase quite alarmingly.
91. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1273.
92. See id. at 1269.
93. See Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 1394. ("I am more concerned with the plight
of black communities whose welfare is slighted by criminal justice systems that respond more
forcefully to the killing of whites than the killing of blacks than I am concerned with the plight of
convicted murderers, black or white." Id.)
94. See id.
95. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1266.
96. See id.
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presupposition is that criminals don't matter: whatever burdens they suffer
can be discounted in calculating the disparate racial impact of law en-
forcement policies on the black community. For Kennedy, there is no ad-
verse impact on the black community because there is no racially inimica-
ble impact that matters or that could be subject to criticism. On the
contrary, the effects of law enforcement are all positive because the Afri-
can-American community is singled out for special treatment which vigor-
ously tackles the problem of black criminality.97 Kennedy may hope to
justify the 'disparate' part of disparate impact (as, for instance, D'Souza
does). However, Kennedy concentrates on the 'impact' side to deny that
there is any negative impact at all. Crack users are removed from society,
murderers permanently so.
Some courts have not been quite so sanguine about the increased
criminalization of African-Americans along racial lines as a result of the
disparate treatment for crack and powder cocaine use.98 Judges Heany and
Bright, both of the Eighth Circuit, have separately questioned the distinc-
tion between powdered and crack cocaine. 99 In United States v. Walls,1' °
the D.C. district court held that the minimum sentence for crack cocaine
offenses constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.0 ° In United States v. Clary,1°2 Judge Clyde Cahill observed
that:
this one provision, the crack statute, has been directly responsible for
incarcerating nearly an entire generation of young black American
men for very long periods, usually during the most productive time
of their lives. Inasmuch as crack and powder cocaine are really the
97. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
98. See DOUGLAS MCDONALD & KENNETH CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATrER? (THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 1986-1990) (1994). McDonald and Carlson conclude that as a result of the imple-
mentation of the sentencing guidelines which the United States Sentencing Commission submit-
ted to Congress in 1987 large disparities have appeared between the sentences of white offenders
in contrast to black and Hispanic ones. See id. "During 1986-88, before full implementation of
sentencing guidelines, white, black and Hispanic offenders received similar sentences, on aver-
age, in Federal district courts." Id. Since the guidelines were introduced, black offenders re-
ceived prison sentences that were, on average, 41 percent longer than for whites. See id.
McDonald and Carson attribute this disparity to different sentences for trafficking in crack or
powder cocaine. See id. See also Charles J. Ogletree, Race and Sentencing: The Significance of
Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 229, 230 (1994) [hereinafter,
Ogletree, Sentencing].
99. See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heany, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., dissenting).
100. 841 F.Supp. 24,25 (D.D.C. 1994).
101. Seeid.at3l.
102. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
same drug... it appears likely that race rather than conduct was the
determining factor. 0
3
He held that penalizing blacks more harshly than whites for their choice of
drug constituted an assault on black communities in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.1°4
The case Kennedy is most keen on rebutting, however, is State v. Rus-
sell 05 which graphically used the data illustrating the disparities in sen-
tencing to conclude that minorities were sentenced to much longer periods
of incarceration than whites, simply on the basis of the drug used. Ken-
nedy argues that the Russell court was "insufficiently attentive to the dif-
ference between a law that burdens a racial minority community as a whole
as distinct from a law that burdens a mere subset of that community."
' 1 6
Furthermore, he claims that the "conventional racial critiques of the state
[which] maintain that the criminal justice system is infected with a perva-
sive, systematic racial bias," "obscure analysis of a wide range of prob-
lems" and "stifl[e] intelligent debate over drug policy." 107 That is (in part)
because they manifest an unsophisticated understanding of the diversity
and heterogeneity of the African-American community.10 8
Kennedy's argument might be more acceptable if policy decisions on
how to conduct the 'war on drugs' were bias-free. This is, after all, what is
guaranteed under the rubric of 'due process of the law.'" °9 The problem is
that the decision-making process at every stage of the 'war on drugs' is
103. Id. at 770.
104. See id. at 797. See also Ogletree, Sentencing, supra note 98, at 230.
105. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (In Russell, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision which held that a statutory distinction drawn between quantity of crack
cocaine possessed and quantity of powder cocaine possessed for purposes of charging and sen-
tencing violated the equal protection guarantees of Federal and State Constitutions. See id. at
887, 889. Statistical evidence at trial provided that of all persons charged with possession of co-
caine base, 96.6% were black; of all persons charged with possession of powder cocaine, 79.6%
were white. See id. at 887 n.1. Under the State Statute, possession of three grams of crack co-
caine carried a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment while possession of an equal amount
of powder cocaine carried a maximum sentence of five years. See id. Under the sentencing
guidelines, the presumptive sentence for possession of three grams of cocaine was an executed 48
months imprisonment; the presumptive sentence for possession of an equal amount of powder
cocaine was a stayed 12 months imprisonment and probation. See id.).
106. Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1256.
107. Id. at 1257, 1260.
108. See id. at 1258-60.
109. See generally State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 (noting that constitutional guarantees
of equal protection would challenge a classification which "[a]ppears to impose a substantially
disproportionate burden on the very class of people whose history inspired the principles of equal
protection"). Kennedy critiques the idea that racial discrimination pervades definitions of crimi-
nality and the administration of law enforcement but acknowledges that "[t]he administration of
criminal justice has .... [b]een used as an instrument of racial oppression." Kennedy, Criminal
Law, supra note 59, at 1258, 1259.
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discretionary and thus subject to bias (racial or otherwise) in its applica-
tion. Indeed, many of the discretionary decisions have been tainted by ra-
cial bias. In drafting the legislation, Congress was warned, and knew or
should have known, that the differential sentences for crack and powder
cocaine would disproportionately affect the African-American commu-
nity.110 In enforcing the legislation, police have chosen to target the black
community while substantially ignoring the white community."' The
mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine practically forces the judi-
ciary to sentence African-Americans more harshly than whites for similar
offenses.112 Disturbing evidence also exists that undercover police officers
have responded to the difference in sentences by sending away black deal-
ers who provide the more expensive powder cocaine and demanding that
they produce the more harshly criminalized crack cocaine." 3 None of this
is considered by Kennedy, but it has significantly contributed to the "ex-
plosion" of African-Americans in prison since 1980.114
This brings us to the second presupposition of Kennedy's argument:
that it is up to the legislature to set whatever policy goals it wishes and to
determine what initiatives are needed to fight crime.115 However, when
Congress enacts a law that discriminates against minorities on the basis
of race, such a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconsti-
tutional.116 It is a basic tenet of the equal protection clause that the leg-
islature ought not rely upon racial criteria in drafting laws, and the
criminal justice system ought not rely upon racial criteria in enforcing
110. See DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 121. New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
warned that "[b]y choosing prohibition, we are choosing to have an intense crime problem con-
centrated among minorities." Id. See also MICHAEL TONRY, MAUGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1995) (Tonry alleged that it was "easily foreseeable!' that the war on drugs
would disproportionately discriminate against minority communities. See id. at 32.)
111. See id. at 119 ("African-Americans make up 12 percent of the U.S. population and con-
stitute 13 percent of all monthly drug users, but represent 35 percent of those arrested for drug
possession, 55 percent of those convicted of drug possession, and 74 percent of those sentenced
to prison for drug possession.").
112. See id. Some judges, however, are resisting the application of the harsher sentences.
113. See United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24, 26 (D.D.C. 1994) cited in Ogletree, Sen-
tencing, supra note 98, at 231.
114. See DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 117. In 1979, only 6 percent of state inmates and 25
percent of federal inmates had been convicted of drug offenses. In 1991, the proportion of state
inmates convicted of drug offenses had nearly quadrupled to 21%, while the proportion of federal
inmates so convicted had more than doubled to 58%. The overwhelming majority of these new
prison admissions for drug offenses were minority men. See id.
115. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1278.
116. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1879) (citing with approval the
Fourteenth Amendment mandate that no laws denying due process to citizens of the United States
or any state be passed or enforced). It is noteworthy that even with such a recognition the Court
did not disabuse itself of the notion of inherent racial inequality.
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those laws.' 17 It is not the capacity of a particular law or initiative to in-
clude the whole African-American community, rather than merely a subset
of that community, which renders that law or initiative unconstitutional or
immoral. Rather, it is the illegitimate use of racial criteria to unduly pun-
ish or harass a minority racial group that renders the law or initiative un-
constitutional.1 8 Kennedy's discussion of the sentencing guidelines for
crack and powder cocaine misses or minimizes this simple but important
fact.
The criminal justice system is, at all levels of its operation, highly
discretionary. The police have discretion to decide whom to stop and frisk.
State prosecutors have discretion to determine whom to prosecute, and
what charges to bring. And judges have a great deal of discretion, before
the trial, when the jury is selected, throughout the trial itself, and after the
trial during sentencing.119 The existence of such discretion makes possible
the pervasive and cumulative discrimination faced by many African-
Americans who come into contact with the criminal justice system.120
B. Color-Conscious Criminal Justice: Paul Butler
A strikingly different analysis of the intersection of race and crime is
proposed by Professor Paul Butler, who argues that the abuse of discretion
along racial lines which occurs in the criminal justice system should be
combated by 'black power': self-help strategies which enable African-
Americans to exert whatever influence they have to balance the scales of
justice.121 Butler rejects Kennedy's argument that all black criminals de-
serve to be punished. Instead, he writes:
Criminal conduct among African-Americans is often a predictable
reaction to oppression. Sometimes black crime is a symptom of in-
ternalized white supremacy; ... other times it is a reasonable re-
sponse to the racial and economic subordination every African-
American faces every day. Punishing black people for the fruits of
117. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROcESs 129 (1996). Judge A. Leon Higginbotham
has argued that when racism exists in some branches of the criminal justice system it has a cu-
mulative effect on other parts of that system, and extends into society at large. See also
DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 114.
118. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W. 2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1991) (Yetka, J., concurring)
(noting that any legislation that allows "distinctions that have a harsher impact on minority
groups.... effectively penaliz[ing] a suspect group" violated the State and Federal Constitu-
tions).
119. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 117, at ch. 11.
120. See DONZIGER, supra note 46, at 114.
121. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677 (1995) [hereinafter, Butler, Nullification].
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racism is wrong if that punishment is premised on the idea that it is
the black criminal's "just desserts."' "
He proposes a new paradigm of justice which rejects punishment for
the sake of retribution and endorses it for the ends of deterrence and inca-
pacitation. 123 He considers that this model is the standard for justice in the
white community. However, if the criminal justice system will not provide
that same justice for minority communities then, Butler argues, black peo-
ple should help themselves to it:
For pragmatic and political reasons the black community is better off
when some non-violent law breakers remain in the community rather
than go to prison. The decision as to what kind of conduct by Afri-
can-Americans ought to be punished is better made by African-
Americans themselves, based on the cost and benefits to their com-
munity, than by the traditional criminal justice process' which is
controlled by white lawmakers and white law enforcers. Legally, the
doctrine of jury nullification gives the power to make this decision to
African-American jurors who sit in judgement [sic] of African-
American defendants. Considering the costs of law enforcement to
the black community and the failure of white lawmakers to devise
significant non-incarcerative responses to black antisocial conduct, it
is the moral responsibility of black jurors to emancipate some guilty
black outlaws.""
Butler offers two major justifications for his proposal that black jurors
ought to acquit black criminals. Both stem from his contention that "the
idea of 'the rule of law' is more mythological than real, and. . . 'democ-
racy' as practiced in the United States, has betrayed African-Americans far
more than they could ever betray it."1 He first asserts that:
[T]here still is no moral obligation to follow an unjust law ....
Radical critics believe that the criminal law is unjust when applied to
some antisocial conduct by African-Americans: The law uses pun-
ishment to treat social problems that are the result of racism and that
should be addressed by other means such as medical care or the re-
distribution of wealth.
126
The contention that individuals ought not to obey an unjust law has a
long and illustrious history 27 and may be said to occupy a central place in
early American political thought.12 However, the issue is far more com-
plex than revealed by Butler's cursory examination of the problem. First, a
122. Id. at 680.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 679.
125. d. at 706.
126. Id. at 708-09.
127. See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-IL q. 92, a. I ad 4.
128. See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND READING ch.1 (Penguin
Books 1995) (1854).
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legitimate question exists as to whether there is a general obligation to
obey the law,1 29 or whether the obligatory force of the law stems from the
justice of individual law.13  On the former view, if a country's legal sys-
tem is, on balance, good (however that is to be established), then its citi-
zens ought to obey its laws. On this approach, civil disobedience would
constitute a rejection, not of one law, but of the whole legal system. On
the latter analysis, citizens ought only to obey those laws which are in fact
morally justified, whether the legal system as a whole is, on balance, good
or not. Disobeying an unjust law, although liable to legal sanction, is not
just morally permissible, but a became moral imperative.
Butler might seem to endorse the second of these approaches by lim-
iting 'the number of cases in which he would, in fact, propose jury nullifi-
cation.131 He does not agree that a jury ought to acquit every black defen-
dant no matter what crime has been committed.13 2 Instead, he provides a
three-stage test which limits the majority of nullifications to crimes in-
volving drug offenses. 33 He suggests that:
In cases involving violent malum in se crimes like murder, rape, and
assault, jurors should consider the case strictly on the evidence pre-
sented, and, if they have no reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, they should convict. For nonviolent malum in se crimes such
as theft or perjury, nullification is an option that the jury should con-
sider, although there should be no presumption in favor of it.... Fi-
nally, in cases involving nonviolent, malum prohibitum offenses, in-
cluding 'victimless' crimes like narcotics offenses, there should be a
presumption in favor of nullification.
134
Even so, it is not clear whether, having established that a law is un-
just, a citizen ought to disobey that law whenever the opportunity presents
itself. If we do accept that there is a moral duty to disobey an unjust law,
that duty cannot permit just any act of disobedience, but only those acts
which are in fact morally justified. Therefore, if Butler's claim that an Af-
129. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
130. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTHoRrry OFLAw, ch. 12 (1979).
131. See Butler, Nullification, supra note 121, at 715.
132. See id. at 715-16.
133. See id. at 715.
134. Id. at 715. In a later article, he further limits his prescription of legitimate candidates
for nullification. He contends:
I do not advocate universal emancipation: For example, people who sell drugs (in-
cluding, perhaps, tobacco and alcohol) to children should be isolated from the commu-
nity... I recognize the argument that drug selling is not victimless, but on libertarian
grounds, I am not persuaded that this means it should be a crime. I note, however, that
even if my proposal was adopted only with regard to drug users, a great number of
black people would be returned to the community.
Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 148-49
(1996) [hereinafter, Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice].
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rican-American ought always to acquit an African-American drug user had
moral force (and it does not), it would still be unjustified because it is
over-inclusive and insensitive to the facts of particular situations. Butler
would have to demonstrate that on every occasion upon which the option
of jury nullification arises its use is morally justified. This cannot be
shown by some general argument alone (although that general argument
may, if justified, serve as a premise from which a more fact-sensitive ar-
gument can flow).
In fact, Butler does not rely upon this version of the 'no obligation to
obey an unjust law' thesis. Instead, he endorses the version which entails a
rejection of the general obligation to obey the law, by encouraging Afri-
can-Americans to 'opt out' of the American system of criminal justice.,
The problem with this approach is its generality: you cannot, on this
model, choose which laws you wish to disobey. In rejecting the general
obligation to obey the law you reject the legitimacy of the whole legal
system to govern you (and others like you). You cannot, with integrity,
reject the operation of the law as it impacts upon drug enforcement in mi-
nority communities and then call upon the law to prevent or prosecute
crime, enforce contracts, and transfer property.
Butler's rationale for prescribing the use of racially-motivated nullifi-
cation denies the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Butler does
not, however, anticipate the consequences of this denial. His argument is
that the presence of black jurors in criminal trials serves the symbolic
function-Butler calls it the "legitimization function"135 -of conveying the
message that the criminal justice system is fair and does not discriminate
against minorities on the basis of their race.1 36 Black participation legiti-
mizes the operation of the criminal justice system. Therefore, African-
Americans should refuse to let the law legitimize the racist criminalization
of minorities and should use the system to engage in (essentially small-
scale) acts of acquittal.
However, if the Black community adopted the tactic of jury nullifica-
tion for even the small portion of offenses which Butler identifies, this
would have the symbolic function of sending the message that the African-
American community had opted out of the (illegitimate) criminal justice
system. Opting out would not prevent the criminal justice system from
135. Butler, Nullification, supra note 121, at712-14.
136. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("[tjhe harm from discriminatory
jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the
entire community," and allowing black people to serve on the jury strengthens "public respect for
our criminal justice system and the rule of law." Id.). See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 49 (1992) (the exclusion of blacks from juries "underminets] ... public confidence-as well
[it] should.").
continuing to operate: policemen would still arrest black suspects, and
courts would still convict them. However, if Butler's proposal worked, it
is difficult to imagine why courts would allow black jurors to sit in judg-
ment over their peers. If Butler's view prevailed, a prosecutor might have
a compelling argument that he or she is justified in using race as a criterion
to strike jurors. With today's increasingly conservative judiciary, the gains
instituted by Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits race-based considera-
tions in the use of peremptory strikes for the purposes of jury selection 37
might be done away with or might be lost.
C. A Moderately Radical Alternative
Kennedy and Butler approach the issue of the criminal justice system
and the African-American community from different poles. Kennedy takes
a stand which favors government intervention to redress the harms that
black criminals inflict upon the black community,138 whereas Butler be-
lieves that black criminality ought to be dealt with by resisting government
intervention-in the form of the operation of the criminal justice system--
where at all possible and morally warranted.139 Kennedy justifies the dif-
ferential treatment meted out to the mostly black users of crack cocaine by
suggesting that external intervention by law enforcement agencies is nec-
essary to discipline a subset of a non-homogeneous community.1) 4  Butler,
on the other hand, presents a vision of the black community as self-
regulating and tight-knit, with both the criminal and his community sharing
an interest in his rehabilitation.141 Finally, the aim of both Kennedy's and
137. See id. at 79-80.
138. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1259-60. Kennedy's stand is based
upon:
[A] perception of criminal law enforcement as a public good, a sympathetic identifica-
tion with the actual and potential victims of crime, and a commitment to policies that
offer greater physical security to minority communities, even if that means ceding
greater powers to law enforcement agencies and thus concomitantly narrowing the for-
mal liberties that individuals currently enjoy.
Il
139. See Butler, Nullification, supra note 121, at 679.
140. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1266-67 ("Assuming that one believes in
criminalizing the distribution of crack cocaine, punishing this conduct is a public good. It is a
'burden' on those who are convicted of engaging in this conduct. But it is presumably a benefit
for the great mass of law-abiding people." Id.).
141. Butler states the following:
[W]hen people involved with drugs injure-if anyone-only themselves or other con-
senting adults, the African-American juror has a choice. She can vote to stick the per-
son in a box for five or ten years and watch what happens when he leaves the box. The
better decision, however, would be to allow that person to remain in the community and
try to help him, if he needs help .... Many African-Americans are engaged in those ef-
forts right now. Perhaps their concern stems less from altruism than from necessity:
They cannot afford to write off the large number of black people who, unlike many
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Butler's proposed solutions is to secure for the black community the same
level of treatment as is accorded to whites. Kennedy argues that this can
only be achieved through greater law enforcement, which, he contends,
would demonstrate that the state shares the same interest in providing se-
curity for the black community as for the white. 42 Butler, on the contrary,
contends that it is decreased prosecution which applies white standards of
criminality to the black community.
1 43
Butler and Kennedy come to opposing conclusions over the best
means of securing equal standards of criminality because they each limit
their consideration of the harms suffered by the black community, ignoring
damaging counter-arguments. Butler ignores the effects of drugs on the
community at large by regarding drug abuse as a 'victimless crime.' He
asks:
[W]hat about when locking up a black man has no or little net effect
on public safety, when, for example, the crime with which he was
charged is victimless? Putting aside for a moment the legal implica-
tions, couldn't an analysis of the costs and benefits to the African-
American community present an argument against incarceration? I
argue yes in light of the substantial costs to the community of law
enforcement. 14
Such an approach enables Butler to concentrate solely on the individ-
ual using the drugs as the 'victim,' without considering the criminal acts
which may be perpetrated on the larger community in order to support the
drug user's habit.145
whites, have come under the purview of criminal justice for using or selling illegal
drugs.
Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 153-54.
142. See Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1267-68.
143. Butler suggests that:
If de facto decriminalization is the result of nullification, police would be according
African Americans honorary white status, since officers already have abandoned exces-
sive enforcement of drug laws in white neighborhoods... [T]he white community does
not appear to suffer dire consequences from this relaxation of prosecution of victimless
crime. As far as law enforcement is concerned, what is good enough for white people
is good enough for African Americans.
Butler, The Evil ofAmerican Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 154.
144. Butler, Nullification, supra note 121, at 698.
145. For example, FBI statistics in Iowa show that there were 7,562 bank robberies in 1996,
up nearly 10% from the previous year. See THE DES MOINES REGISTER, June 22, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. This increase has been associated with crime committed
to support drug habits. See iL Similar reports have been documented in Washington D.C. See,
e.g., Thomas, Statistics Show Increase in Bank Robberies, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 4,
1997, at A2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. In Savannah, Georgia, the police
found that over the 15 weeks immediately preceding October 1987, all persons arrested for bank
robberies had a drug habit. See Savannah Police Create Task Force to Root Out Housing Proj-
ect Pushers, UPI, Oct. 1, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
Kennedy, on the other hand, manages to ignore the evil effects of in-
creased criminalization on the black community, and especially the differ-
ential styles of policing and prosecuting the black drug user, as opposed to
the white. He fails to recognize the full impact of the burdens imposed
upon the black community because he refuses to aggregate them, or con-
sider that they are not equally imposed upon the white community:
Although black youngsters who wish to stay out late are burdened by
a curfew, blacks who feel more secure because of the curfew are
benefited. Although black members of violent gangs are burdened
by police crackdowns on such gangs, blacks terrorized by gangs are
aided. Although some black women who use illicit drugs harmful to
unborn babies are burdened by prosecutions that punish them for this
conduct, it is at least plausible to suppose that the deterrent effect of
such prosecutions will help other black unborn children.
146
A community which suffers increased criminalization of its drug-
users, curfews for its youth, a 'stop and frisk' policy directed at its young
men, and increased surveillance and prosecution of its mothers for fetal
endangerment does not suffer a lack of policing in comparison with the
white community, and certainly does not require any more than it is al-
ready getting.
In fact, I argue that:
[T]he day-to-day experience of residents of many urban centers
shows that the power to stop and frisk is still applied discriminatorily
against people of color. Studies reveal that African-Americans are
more likely than whites in similar situations to be stopped by the po-
lice. While courts have never condoned the use of race or ethnicity
as the sole basis for an investigatory stop, "[tihere is substantial evi-
dence that many police officers believe minority race indicates a
general propensity to commit crime.
147
Furthermore,
Hospitals, many of which now screen newborns for evidence of
drugs in their urine and report positive results to child welfare
authorities, disproportionately report African-American patients.
Often, hospitals do not rely upon formal screening protocols, but de-
pend solely upon the suspicions of health care professionals. These
suspicions often derive from stereotypes and assumptions regarding
the characteristics of drug addicts. Doctors are more likely to report
African-American women to the government than their wealthy
white patients. Roberts notes a study in the New England Journal of
Medicine reveals little difference in the prevalence of substance
abuse by pregnant women by race or by class.... The prosecution
theory reflected in the disproportionate number of African-American
women prosecuted for fetal endangerment should be challenged.
146. Kennedy, Criminal Law, supra note 59, at 1273-74.
147. Ogletree, Race, supra note 48, at 10.
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These cases are built upon every degrading stereotype of black
women: that black women are irresponsible, welfare dependent,
drug-addicted, and finally, unfit mothers.148
Kennedy thinks that such policies benefit the black community. The cor-
rect view, however, is that they impose an extreme burden on our youth
motivated solely by considerations of race.
Both Butler and Kennedy select a particular vision of the structure
and good of the black community, and consequently leave out black indi-
viduals who comprise that community. I do not wish to suggest that the
antidote to their arguments is an individual-centered response to the issue
of black criminality. What is required is a response which takes into ac-
count the needs of both the individual and the community, and remains
open-minded about who and what comprises the community.
Our relation, as African-Americans, to our own community is not as
straightforward as either Kennedy or Butler would have us believe. Ken-
nedy's sense of that relationship depends upon a radical disconnection
between the criminal and non-criminal classes in the black community.
This is not the experience of many African-Americans today. 149 It is cer-
tainly not my experience. I have seen family and close friends suffer the
indignities of racially motivated abusive treatment at the hands of law en-
forcement agencies. Too many times I return home to hear what Sara Law-
rence-Lightfoot described as "stories of human tragedy and defeat-the
people who have been murdered or imprisoned, the old folks who have
died, the children who have had babies or gotten hooked on drugs."'150 It is
essential not to forget our indebtedness to those upon whose shoulders we
stand, the people I call my "home folks."''
1
Equally, I have never been tempted by Butler's commitment to un-
dermining the judicial process. Not only is such commitment political sui-
cide, it is immoral. I have said that "'our generation of professionals'
needs to assume a greater responsibility for the civil rights organiza-
tions' ... ' We need to find a way to reengage in the work of these organi-
zations... We need to become recommitted, reenergized."" 5 2 Essentially,
the task is to provide equality of opportunity for those African-Americans
who are brought under the ambit of the criminal justice system by affirma-
148. Id. at 9.
149. See generally NAACP & THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INsrrruT AT HARVARD LAw
SCHOOL, BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN
MINORITY COMMuNrrIEs 36-39 (1994) (citing numerous instances of minority harassment by
police officers).
150. SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, Charles Ogletree: Blow, Jazzman, Blow, in I HAVE
KNOWN RIvERS: LIvEs OF LOSS AND LIBERATION 154 (1994).
151. Id. at 149.
152. Id. at 168.
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tively ensuring that they have access to first-class criminal representation,
and to teach our youth to escape that system's clutches by creating power-
fil role models for them to follow. Only by continually pressing for re-
form can we hope to achieve these goals which have marked my career as a
student agitator, public defender, and Harvard Law Professor.
1 53
Where Kennedy's supposedly liberal desire to promote the good of
the black community turns decidedly conservative is in his identification of
crime as an attack on that community. It is the representation of the crimi-
nal as the enemy of society which justifies his "criminals don't matter"
mentality described above.154 This places no limit on what can be done to
the criminal in the name of punishment or deterrence. Fairness ceases to
be an issue. It no longer matters whether one group is more harshly pun-
ished than another for the same sort of crime, because the protection of the
community justifies disparate sentences for substantially similar crimes.
All that needs to be established is that one community is more susceptible
to the threat of certain sorts of crime than another.
This justification conveniently ignores the problem of criminalization
itself-what is to count as crime, and who is to count as a criminal. This
criminalization may be motivated by the prevalence in the criminal justice
system of race-based classifications which do not recognize black crimi-
nals as individuals but instead rely upon discriminatory social stereo-
types. 155 It may also be premised upon the very failure to regard blacks
with the same solicitude as whites which Kennedy so eagerly identifies. 56
In either event, the very community that is supposed to be protected is the
one that is characterized as most prone to crime; and its members are
criminalized deservedly or not.
Instead of constructively engaging in an effort to ameliorate the con-
ditions of inner-city urban life, law-and-order advocates abdicate responsi-
bility by characterizing criminality as an individual failing that can be
combated using traditional forms of punishment. 157 This seems an espe-
cially inadequate response when confronted with the reality of crack co-
caine. As David Cole suggests, "[I]ncarceration-especially on such a
massive scale in a well-defined community-is far from an adequate solu-
tion, and may well exacerbate the problems associated with crack and
crime. 1 5
8
153. See id at 147-48, 139, 163-64.
154. See discussion supra pp. 227,229-232.
155. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment On Randall Kennedy's
"Politics of Distinction, " 83 GEO. L. J. 2547, 2565-67 (1995).
156. See Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 1425.
157. See Cole, supra note 155, at 1267-70.
158. Id. at 2558.
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The point is that if crack is as addictive and destructive a drug as leg-
islators believe-and it is-then ordinary notions of criminal responsibility
fail to apply. Crack works across generational and gender lines to include
a whole new group of people within the ambit of drug prevention laws.
159
Increased criminalization of the African-American community and its
crack cocaine users can only function as a short term quick fix, and a
longer term means of avoiding the responsibility the American community
has to those who cannot take care of themselves.
Instead of the law-and-order claim that criminality represents an at-
tack on the community by some outside force, crime demonstrates a failure
of community itself. The real question is not why there is so much crime,
but why there is so little? One answer is that peer group pressure and in-
ternalized moral codes operate to keep most citizens law-abiding.
16°
Community restraints keep most people in check, and crime occurs when
those restraints fail. This failure should be seen, not just as the responsi-
bility of the criminal, but also, on occasion, a failure on1 the part of society
to engage the criminal's respect.
161
The first issue is whether the present urban situation reflects that so-
ciety. Next, what is achieved by sending people to jail, only to have them
return to society, unchanged? A crack user may even have gained some
"ghetto credibility" through incarceration " 62 His or her economic and so-
cial situation also remains unaltered, making it likely that he or she will
return to drugs and crime. What we need is an emphasis on rehabilitation,
not just of the criminal, but of the community-society itself. That is the
real challenge presented by urban crime.
Nowhere is the failed commitment to community more influential
than on the criminal justice system. The power to police and to prosecute
carries with it an enormous amount of discretion. Kennedy himself sug-
gests, "the power to be lenient is [also] the power to discriminate. 163 His
own argument-that there is an "economy of sympathy" by which indi-
159. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identi-
fication, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992).
160. See Cole, supra note 155, at 2559.
161. Now, I am not endorsing an outlook which regards the criminal as a victim who is un-
qualifiedly entitled to our help just by virtue of being black. This sort of "racial reasoning,"
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS 24-25 (1993), is what is most problematic about Butler's call for
jury nullification. He justifies acquitting drug pushers or users as an act of self-help on the basis
that we are all, always, as black folks, victims of the criminal justice system. That is neither true
nor enough. Rather, the justification for the approach proposed here is a longer-term focus on
what sort of a society we would wish our citizens--of all colors--to live in, and judge the mi-
norities suffering from crack cocaine-and its overcriminalization-on that basis.
162. See Austin, supra note 159, at 1776-80.
163. Kennedy, McClesky, supra note 52, at 312 (quoting KENNETH C. DAvIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)).
viduals of the same race are more likely to identify with each other than
with individuals from other races-demonstrates how a failure to treat all
Americans as part of the same community can result in the disproportion-
ately punitive application of the criminal justice system to members of ra-
cial minorities.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE
A. The Politics of Racial Progress
The impact of a failure of community on minority citizens extends
beyond issues of crime and punishment. The problems faced by African-
Americans within the criminal justice system are a small part of a much
larger issue: creating opportunities to participate in American society. The
challenge is to recognize this as a problem which affects-and needs to be
addressed by-both black and white communities. It is important to give
new impetus to the old effort to forge a new American polity whereby both
black and white can flourish together.
One of the modem architects of this vision was, ironically, a southern
white President, Lyndon Baines Johnson. He recognized that an America
fit for all its citizens must be created by all of its citizens, regardless of
color. 164 In a speech at Howard University in 1965, Johnson talked about
solving the problems presented by the burden of race. He said that:
In far too many ways American Negroes have been another nation,
deprived of freedom, crippled by hatred, the doors of opportunity
closed to them. In our time, change has come to this nation. The
American Negro, acting with impressive restraint, has peacefully
protested and marched, entered the courtrooms in the seats of gov-
ernment, and demanded a justice that has long been denied. The
voice of the Negro was the call to action. However, it is a tribute to
America that, once aroused, the courts and the Congress, the Presi-
dent and most of the people, have been allies of progress.165
In arguing for providing benefits for past racial burdens, President
Johnson argued, "You don't take a person who for years has been hobbled
by change and liberate them, bring them up to the starting line of a race
and then say 'you are free to compete with all the others' and still justly
believe that you have been completely fair." 166 "To this end," he said:
[O]pportunity is essential but not enough. Men and women of all
races are born with the same range of abilities, but ability is not just
164. See Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights: Commencement Address at Howard
Univ. (June 4, 1965), in 2 PUBLC PAPERS OFTHE PRESIDENTS 640 (1965).
165. Id at 635.
166. Il at 636.
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the product of birth, ability is stretched or stunted by the family that
you live with, in the neighborhood you live in, by the school you go
to, and the poverty or the richness of your surroundings. It is the
product of a hundred unseen forces playing upon the little infant, the
child, and finally the man. For the task is to give 28 million Negroes
the same chance as every other American to learn and grow, to work
and share in society, to develop their abilities, phrsical, mental, and
spiritual, and to pursue their individual happiness.
In this way, Johnson acknowledged that the fourth arm of government is
the sovereign people, and their combined action is necessary to make and
remake the American polity until it includes all citizens as equals.
Inclusion, commonly called "diversity," is one of the major justifica-
tions behind affirmative action programs, especially in education. I prefer
the term "inclusion" to "diversity" because diversity seems to me to have
the flavor of an instrumental good and is often justified as such. 168 For in-
stance, diversity in education is sometimes commended because of the dif-
ferent points of view a racially diverse student body can bring to the study
of a particular subject or the academic community as a whole. More com-
pelling, however, is the fact that every individual has a right to participate
in society and not to be excluded merely on account of his or her race.
Christopher Edley argues that, along with the value of remediation of past
wrongs, inclusiveness can be used to justify affirmative action policies at
universities and in the workplace.
69
B. An Alternate Strategy for Racial Progress
The problem with the current affirmative action debate is its narrow
focus. 70 Certainly, as President Johnson conceived it, affirmative action
was intended to be part of a larger vision: the creation of a "Great Soci-
ety." One way of demonstrating the emptiness of the current discussion is
to remember that merit and affirmative action are not diametrically op-
posed to each other. Merit-based standards in the awarding of contracts or
university places were supposed to replace "old boy" networks that had
traditionally kept African-Americans from advancing in the workplace or
getting into college. Merit was intended to coexist alongside affirmative
action programs, which were to open the door to otherwise qualified appli-
cants who had been denied a job or a place in school on the basis of dis-
crimination.'
167. Id.
168. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, Jr., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHrrE 125-26 (1996).
169. See id. at 126, 131-39.
170. See Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 955 (1996).
171. See EDLEY, supra note 168, at 120-21.
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Affirmative action remains an important means of alleviating the bur-
dens on the black community but is being attacked on a number of
fronts.172 Three claims are made by conservative critics in order to under-
mine it. First, critics claim that affirmative action stigmatizes its intended
beneficiaries. Minorities who do get the job or.go to college are assumed
by their white co-workers or students to have got there on the basis of race
alone. 173 Second, critics contend that those who do benefit from affirma-
tive action are not the people who ought to benefit from affirmative action.
It is predominantly middle-class African-Americans attending elite institu-
tions who benefit from affirmative action. Poor, working-class African-
Americans who need the most help remain untouched by it.174 Third, de-
tractors allege that affirmative action is used to undermine fair and meri-
tocratic selection procedures by imposing race-based systems of prefer-
ence. The argument is that white applicants who, on race-neutral criteria,
ought to get the job or go to college are passed over in favor of less quali-
fied minorities solely because of the color of their skin.
175
The first problem I wish to address is Stephen L. Carter's contention
that the "best black syndrome" cripples intended beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action.17 6 "[Elvery black professional, in our racially conscious times,
is assumed to have earned his or her position not by being among the best
available but by being among the best available blacks. 177 Affirmative
action, thus, prevents African-Americans from being ranked against whites
and perpetuates "the durable and demeaning stereotype of black people as
unable to compete with white ones. 118
Affirmative action contributes to the stigma of "best black" by distin-
guishing merit from reward. The argument is that those who are rewarded
with a college place or who are hired for a job are not necessarily those
who "merit" it. In part, this argument depends upon identifying reward
with the goal of remediation (making up for past discrimination) and merit
with the goal of inclusion (ensuring that deserving individuals are not ex-
cluded on grounds of race alone). The principle, however, is that all those
who merit a place ought to be awarded one. Those who do not merit a
place ought not to have race taken into consideration as a factor. Only
172. See id. at 80-83.
173. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTONS OF AN AFFInmTivE ACTION BABY 11-27
(1991).
174. See Richard Kahlenberg, Class, Not Race: An Affirmative Action that Works, THE NEw
REPUBuC, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21.
175. See BOB ZELNICK, BACKFIRE, A REPORTER'S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 18
(1996).
176. See CARTER, supra note 173, at 49.
177. Id. at 55.
178. Id. at 50.
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when the two are conflated does the stigma of "best black" arise, insisting
that not everyone who is rewarded with a place merits it, undermining the
security of those minorities who did merit a place, regardless of race.
It might be possible to avoid such a stigma by sharply separating these
two goals, and to thoroughly advertise who was awarded which place on
which basis. The question is, would this be a price we are willing to pay?
As Edley suggests, affirmative action involves hard choices; winners and
losers emerge.179 But if our commitment to an inclusive community is
such that we are willing to accept students with lower grades, or employees
with less qualifications-in part because to do so remedies past and pres-
ent discrimination, but also because of the benefits of inclusiveness it-
self-then the burdens that affirmative action creates for the rest of us
should be possible to bear.
The second problem I address is the rejection of race-conscious justi-
fications of affirmative action. Both Richard Kahlenberg and Cornell
West have argued against primarily race-based solutions to the problem of
minority exclusion from the workplace and higher education.18 0 They ar-
gue that while the justification for affirmative action is the provision of
opportunity to economically and educationally disadvantaged African-
Americans, those it actually does help are almost exclusively the black
middle-class. 181 Both propose a color-blind solution that targets the 'truly'
disadvantaged: class-based affirnative action.182 Kahlenberg suggests that
this approach would enable the President to build coalitions across the ra-
cial divide and re-establish some consensus on the need for affirmative ac-
tion programs for all those at the bottom of the social heap, regardless of
race.
183
Unfortunately, this argument gets the picture back to front. It sees af-
firmative action as the whole picture, and racial uplift as just a part of that
whole. However, affirmative action was envisaged as one of a battery of
techniques promoting racial uplift, not as something to be used in isolation.
This is not to minimize the extent to which class-based solutions are neces-
sary in achieving social justice. Christopher Edley, Jr., for example, in his
discussion of the White House review of affirmative action, demonstrates
that "[e]conomic and social disadvantages remain powerfully linked with
179. See EDLEY, supra note 168, at 83.
180. See Kahlenberg, supra note 174, at 21; WEST, supra note 161, at 64 (1993) (arguing in
favor of class-based affirmative action and asserting that the prevailing racial discrimination
measures in the sixties need an "enforceable race-based and later gender-based affirmative ac-
tion") (emphasis in original).
181. See Kahlenberg, supra note 174, at24.
182. See generally WEST, supra note 161, at 64.
183. See Kahlenberg, supra note 174, at 27.
color, and this linkage exacts an enormous toll on the perception and real-
ity of opportunity in America."184 To focus on poverty issues alone, how-
ever, would be to miss the special burdens suffered by African-Americans
as a class. 185 Further, to regard affirmative action as some sort of "second
class" civil rights strategy, born of compromise rather than defensible on
its own, 186 would be to mistake the place of affirmative action in the civil
rights argument. Worse, it would get the civil rights argument wrong.
As stated above, the major problem with the current affirmative action
debate is that it is too narrowly focused. Focusing on discrete areas of so-
cial and racial injustice, does not address the wider racial problem: the de-
struction of black community and dearth of inter-community understand-
ing. This myopia allows us to parcel off the different problems of crime,
welfare dependency, unemployment, affirmative action, and political rep-
resentation into discrete spheres without addressing them as part of a uni-
fied whole. As Sturm and Guinier point out, liberals are in thrall to a de-
bate phrased in conservative terms.87 We allow ourselves to forget, for
example, that merit is not necessarily opposed to affirmative action, that
the merit standard is, in fact, supposed to combat the same race- and class-
based systems of preference as affirmative action, and that most preference
schemes, official or unofficial, still benefit whites. 88 Consequently, we
become obsessed with demonstrating that affirmative action is not just re-
verse racism, that African-Americans are offered jobs or a college educa-
tion, because it is merited, rather than as an act of white beneficence. We
become defensive when faced with people like ABC news correspondent
Bob Zelnick, who advocates the view that affirmative action unfairly pe-
nalizes those white innocents who actually deserve the positions which go
to minorities. 89
Recipients of affirmative action are, Zelnick claims, "all too of-
ten ... less qualified than the victim of race discrimination." 19° He argues
that the various tests used to assess aptitude in the areas of employment
and education are not skewed against minorities. Rather, for Zelnick, Af-
rican-Americans and Hispanics are just not as clever as whites and Asians,
so these minorities have ensured that "Iflor much of the past generation
one of the pillars of affirmative action establishment has been the assault
184. EDLEY, supra note 168, at 71.
185. See id. at 42-50.
186. See WEST, supra note 161, at 64-66.
187. See Sturm and Guirier, supra note 170, at 955 n.6 (citing Clint Bolick, Discriminating
Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A15; Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at 35, 40).
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on objective standards of merit"19' resulting in "racial preferences en-
shrined into law [which] are the first cousins to black separatism and black
supremacy."'
192
Zelnick's position is an extreme form of a fairly common argument:
that African-Americans are underachieving and over-demanding; that our
demands are premised on an outdated notion of white racism (whites are
no longer racist); that granting these demands will adversely affect whites;
and that these demands are based on a form of reverse racism-a black
solidarity which spells white disempowerment. What this argument fails
to consider is that black under-achievement is often linked to material fac-
tors. For example, success in tests of all sorts is strongly correlated with
class, 193 so the fact that more African-Americans than other racial groups
are born below the poverty line is bound to affect how well African-
Americans score. 194 In addition, the stability of an individual's family
situation aids or impedes his or her academic and social achievement. 195
So the disintegration of the black urban family, in part due to the effects of
the criminal justice system, takes its toll on youth aspiration and achieve-
ment.
The attempt to put the blame for black underachievement on the bio-
logical or cultural failure of the group as a whole feeds into a notion of in-
dividual responsibility and accountability which is very persuasive for
many Americans. It places responsibility squarely on the struggling indi-
vidual or group and minimizes outside factors. It allows the perpetuation
of an image of African-Americans as lazy and ignorant: when we ask for
some assistance to redress the impact that poverty, underemployment, poor
education, and miserable living conditions have upon our lives, we are de-
manding more than we deserve.
The rejection of the "materialist" argument-that social conditions af-
fect social achievement-depends in part upon what might be called the
"structural racism" argument. It denies that African-Americans can point
to any fact which demonstrates that whites are racist, and that this racism
prevents white advancement. 196 Instead, African-Americans are anachro-
nistically and self-destructively casting themselves in the role of victims.
191. Id.
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This denial of white racism, and the notion of responsibility which fosters
it, denies the extent to which social opportunity depends upon where and
to whom you are born. Beyond that, another important factor that affects
African-Americans of all classes is the small acts of discretion-for exam-
ple, the availability of mentors-to which "racial empathy may limit black
access."
The nature of this discretion makes it difficult to prove -race is a fac-
tor-disparate impact, however, does not. This is essentially true when the
continuing effect of a history of political and economic disenfranchise-
ment, combined with the continued exclusion of minorities from social
networks, is taken into account. Now, I am not proposing that African-
Americans adopt a "victim mentality" and lay the blame for every failure
to advance at the door of white racism. Instead, I favor calling for all sides
in the racial debate to seriously discuss the benefits and burdens of race.
Only in this way can we remake American society as a greater, inclusive
whole. As my colleague, Professor Christopher Edley, Jr. has argued, this
is a difficult task.197 The problems associated with race have many
sources, and the different solutions are justified by different values.
Conclusion
The problem presented by the color line in modem America is diffi-
cult but not intractable. However, race is attached to too many other is-
sues-democracy and poverty most notably--for the problem of the color
line to be resolved any time soon. But too often, and for too long, Ameri-
cans have been willing to sacrifice the rights of minorities for short term
gain. Since the country's inception, too many people have been prepared
to tolerate dual Americas existing side by side, one for the majority, and
one for the rest.
President Clinton recently talked about the complexity of race in
America and offered us an observation and a solution. That solution is to
see through the prism of race that we are all implicated in this problem
whether we are members of a racial minority or the racial majority. The
President said:
White America must understand and acknowledge the roots of black
pain. It began with unequal treatment first in law and later in fact.
African-Americans, indeed, have lived too long with the justice sys-
tem that in too many cases has been, and continues to be, less than
just. The record of abuses extends from lynchings and trumped up
charges, to false arrests and police brutality. The tragedies of
197. See generally EDLEY, supra note 168.
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Emmett Till and Rodney King are bloody markers on the very same
road.19
8
On the other hand he cautioned:
Blacks must understand and acknowledge the roots of white fear in
America. There is a legitimate fear of the violence that is too preva-
lent in our urban areas. And often, by experience or at least what
people see on the news at night, violence for those white people too
often has a black face.
199
Finally, he concluded:
Both sides seem to fear deep down inside that they will never quite
be able to see each other as more than enemy faces, all of whom
carry at least a slither of bigotry in their hearts. Difference of opin-
ion rooted in difference of experiences are healthy, and indeed es-
sential for democracies. But differences so great and so rooted in
race threaten to divide the house. ... As Dr. King told us 'we must
learn to live together as brothers or we will perish as fools'. 2o
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